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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
TYLER JOHN STEVENSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

SUPREME COURT NOS. 47305-2019, 473062019, 47307-2019, 47318-2019 & 47319-2019
MINIDOKA COUNTY NOS. CR-2013-1942,
CR-2017-1533 & CR34-18-03575, and
CASSIA COUNTY NOS. CR-2014-4286 &
CR16-17-04629
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tyler John Stevenson admitted to violating his probation in four separate cases
(“Minidoka Case 1,” “Minidoka Case 2,” “Cassia Case 1,” and “Cassia Case 2”; collectively,
“the probation cases”). At the same time, he pled guilty to three counts of Grand Theft by
Possession of Stolen Property and one count of Grand Theft in a separate case (“Minidoka Case
3” or “the new case”). Mr. Stevenson’s probation was revoked in the probation cases, and he was
sentenced in the new case to a unified term of fourteen years, with seven years fixed. In this
consolidated appeal, Mr. Stevenson argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to
retain jurisdiction in all five cases.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2013, Mr. Stevenson pled guilty in Minidoka Case 1 to grand theft and judgment was
withheld for two years. (47305 R. Vol. 1, pp.73-75.)1 The following year, Mr. Stevenson was
arrested and charged with grand theft in Cassia Case 1. (47318 R., pp.33-34.) He was sentenced
to eight years, with three years fixed, with the court suspending that sentence and placing him on
probation for four years. (47318 R., pp.100-02.) After he was sentenced in Cassia Case 1, the
withheld judgment in Minidoka Case 1 was revoked and he was sentenced to a unified term of
eight years, with three years fixed, with the court suspending that sentence and placing him on
probation for four years, concurrent with Cassia Case 1. (47305 R. Vol 1, pp.153-55.)
Almost two years later, new charges were filed against Mr. Stevenson in Minidoka Case
2. (47306 R., pp.53-58.) A week later, a motion to revoke probation in Minidoka Case 1 was
filed. (47305 R. Vol. 1, pp.178-79.) Mr. Stevenson was also arraigned for a probation violation
in Cassia Case 1. (47318 R., p.112.) Mr. Stevenson then pled guilty in Minidoka Case 2. (47306
R., pp.148-49.) A joint sentencing and disposition hearing was subsequently held for both
Minidoka Case 1 and Minidoka Case 2. (47305 R. Vol. 2, pp.206-07.) Mr. Stevenson was then
sentenced to a unified term of fourteen years, with six years fixed, with the court retaining
jurisdiction in Minidoka Case 2. (47306 R., pp.143-46.) The court found Mr. Stevenson was in
violation of his probation in Minidoka Case 1, revoked his probation, and retained jurisdiction in
that case as well. (47305 R. Vol. 2, pp.208-09.)
Meanwhile, new charges had been filed against Mr. Stevenson in Cassia Case 2. (47319
R., pp.9-10.) Mr. Stevenson pled guilty to those charges and admitted to violating his probation
in Cassia Case 1. (47318 R., pp.129-30; 47319 R., pp.31-32.) The court revoked his probation in

1

Due to the multiple cases at issue in this appeal, citations to the clerk’s records and presentence
investigation reports (“PSI”) will be referred to by the Docket Number and type of document.
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Cassia Case 1 and retained jurisdiction; and sentenced him in Cassia Case 2 to a unified term of
seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (47318 R., pp.131-32; 47319
R., pp.33-35.) The period of retained jurisdiction was to run concurrently with that of Minidoka
Case 1 and Minidoka Case 2. (47319 R., p.34.)
After successfully completing the retained jurisdiction, Mr. Stevenson was placed on
probation in all four cases. (47305 R. Vol. 2, pp.218-19 (Minidoka Case 1); 47306 R., pp.159-61
(Minidoka Case 2); 47318 R., pp.135-36 (Cassia Case 1); 47319 R., pp.48-49 (Cassia Case 2).)
But shortly after being placed on probation, new charges were filed against
Mr. Stevenson in Minidoka Case 3. (47307 R. Vol. 1., pp.16-17.)
In Minidoka Case 3, an amended complaint was filed charging Mr. Stevenson with three
counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property, one count of grand theft, and two counts
of conspiracy to commit grand theft. (47307 R. Vol. 1, pp.164-70.) After he was bound over to
district court, an Information was filed against Mr. Stevenson for those counts. (47307 R. Vol. 2,
pp.221-27.) An Information Part II was also filed alleging a persistent violator enhancement.
(47307 R. Vol. 2, pp.228-31.)
In the meantime, reports of probation violations were filed in the four probation cases
(47305 R. Vol. 2, pp.229-30; 47318 R., pp.59-60.) The two Cassia County cases were assigned
to the Minidoka district court. (47318 R., p.143; 47319 R., p.64.)
Mr. Stevenson entered into a plea agreement with the State. (47307 R. Vol. 4, pp.54655.) In that agreement, Mr. Stevenson agreed to plead guilty to four of the charged counts which
would count as admissions to his probation violations; the State agreed to dismiss the remaining

3

two counts and the persistent violator enhancement, and had open recommendations for
sentencing. (47305 R. Vol. 4, p.548; July 2019 CoP Tr., p.4, L.24 – p.5, L.3.) 2
A joint change of plea and admit-deny hearing was held in all five cases. (47307 R. Vol.
4, pp.544-45; July 2019 CoP Tr., pp.4-27.) The court confirmed that Mr. Stevenson agreed to
waive the presentence investigation report and that sentencing would be set a week out. (July
2019 CoP Tr., p.5, Ls.4-8.) The court then conducted a plea colloquy with Mr. Stevenson after
which he admitted to violating his probation in the probation cases. (July 2019 CoP Tr., p.9, L.25
– p.25, L.10.)
A joint disposition and sentencing hearing was held the following week for all five of
Mr. Stevenson’s cases. (47307 R., pp.560-62; July 2019 Sent Tr., pp.4-58.)3 At that hearing, the
State recommended unified sentences of fourteen years, with six years fixed, for two counts,
consecutive both to each other and to the probation violation sentences; and unified sentences of
fourteen years, with eight years fixed, for each of the other two counts, concurrent with the
probation violation sentences and the other counts in the new case. (July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.28,
L.3 – p.30, L.13.) Counsel for Mr. Stevenson asked the court to consider a period of retained
jurisdiction in the new case, concurrent with an additional retained jurisdiction in the probation
violation cases. (July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.6-15.)
In the probation cases, the court revoked probation and executed the underlying
sentences, with the sentences all concurrent to each other. (July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.51, L.15 – p.52,
L.13.) For two of the counts in the new case, the court imposed unified sentences of fourteen
years, with six years fixed, concurrent to the sentences in the probation cases. (July 2019 Sent.
2

Citations to the transcript for the joint change of plea and admit-deny hearing held July 8, 2019
will be cited as “July 2019 CoP Tr.”
3
Citations to the transcript for the joint sentencing and disposition hearing held July 16, 2019
will be cited as “July 2019 Sent. Tr.”
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Tr., p.54, Ls.2-10; p.55, Ls.5-11.) In the remaining two counts in the new case, the court imposed
unified sentences of fourteen years, with seven years fixed, concurrent with each other but
consecutive to the sentences in the other counts and the probation cases. (July 2019 Sent.
Tr., p.56, Ls.2-21.)4
Mr. Stevenson timely appealed the revocation of his probation in the probation cases.
(47305 R. Vol. 2, pp.303-04; 47306 R., pp.166-67; 47318 R., pp.166-67; 47319 R., pp.84-85.)
He also timely appealed from the judgment of conviction in the new case. (47307 R., pp.576-78.)
The appeals from Minidoka Case 1, Minidoka Case 2, and Minidoka Case 3 were subsequently
consolidated. (47305 R. Vol. 2, p.312; 47306 R., p.169; 47307 R., p.596.) The appeals from
Cassia Case 1 and Cassia Case 2 were separately consolidated. Both consolidated appeals were
further consolidated for briefing and oral argument.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to retain jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Retain Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
Mr. Stevenson submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its

discretion, by failing to retain jurisdiction upon sentencing him in the new case, and revoking his
probation in the four probation cases. Specifically, he asserts that the district court abused its
4

Mr. Stevenson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35 (see 47307 R. Vol. 4, pp.607-08); however, that motion did not present any “new information
that the court could properly consider.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Accordingly, Mr. Stevenson does not appeal the district court’s denial of that Motion. (47307
R. Vol. 4, p.613.)
5

discretion by not adequately weighing mitigating evidence. Properly considered, that evidence
should have led the district court to retain jurisdiction.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court’s sentencing and probation revocation decisions are both reviewed for

abuse of discretion. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982) (The Idaho “Supreme
Court has applied a general standard of “clear abuse of discretion” to appellate review of
sentencing decisions”); State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 920–21 (1993) (“After a probation
violation has been proven, the decision as to whether to revoke probation and order a previously
imposed sentence is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court”), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Retain Jurisdiction
Mr. Stevenson asserts that the district court did not adequately give mitigating evidence

its proper weight before it imposed sentence in the new case and entered its dispositions in the
probation cases. Properly considered, that mitigating evidence should have led the district court
to retain jurisdiction in all five of Mr. Stevenson’s cases. Mr. Stevenson specifically asserts the
district court did not properly weigh mitigating evidence regarding his mental health, remorse, or
the support offered by his family.
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The mental health of a defendant is a mitigating factor that must be considered by the
district court. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) (“Idaho Code § 19–2523, which
requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an
integral part of the legislature’s repeal of mental condition as a defense.”). There was a wealth of
mitigating evidence regarding Mr. Stevenson’s mental health throughout the records in each
case, all detailing struggles he has had from a very early age. The court recognized
Mr. Stevenson had “some . . . mental health needs or issues” that had been documented before he
went on his rider. (Tr., p.47, Ls.8-9.)
But “some mental health needs or issues” does not begin to adequately describe the
struggles Mr. Stevenson has dealt with his entire life. Multiple presentence investigation reports
detailed how “[a]t

, Tyler was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder by psychiatrist

Coralyn Alexander, MD, who placed him on the psychotropic medications Seroquel, Lithium,
Lamictal.” (47306 PSI, p.16; 47318 PSI, pp.12-13.) He reported that “he struggled in school due
to learning difficulties” before being “diagnosed in 2004 with Dysphonetic Dyslexia.” (47305
PSI, p.8.) His mother said, “He fell through the cracks of the school system because they didn’t
have the right resources to help children with behavior problems. Come to find out he had
dyslexia and ADD.” (47307 R., p.559.) Records received from the “Idaho Department of
Juvenile Corrections revealed ‘Tyler has had past mental health diagnoses, including Conduct
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, Depressive Disorder NOS, and Dysthymic Disorder’ [and that his]
‘emotional and behavioral problems include anger management, relationship problems, mood
swings including signiﬁcant depression, impulsivity and cutting on himself to express his
sadness of the moment.’” (47318 PSI, pp.12-13.) He has been diagnosed with ADHD, something
an evaluating psychiatrist described as “an important causative factor” in his criminal actions.
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(47318 R., p.98.) He told the presentence investigator in Minidoka Case 2 that “committing this
current crime was an ‘unexpected deal’ which he attributed to him being compulsive.” (47306
PSI, p.6.) An evaluation done in Cassia Case 1 also described how Mr. Stevenson had a history
of head injuries at a very early age. (47318 R., pp.96, 98.) He told the presentence investigator in
that case that he was “born without oxygen and [was] struck on the head by a tube at a Costco
store.” (47306 PSI, p.16.) His mother relayed that “in the course of his childhood
[Mr. Stevenson] had somewhere around 7 concussions.” (47307 R., p.559.) Mr. Stevenson also
disclosed that “he suffered from a concussion while committed to the Idaho Department of
Juvenile Corrections.” (47318 PSI, p.12.) An evaluation done in Minidoka Case 1 recommended
that Mr. Stevenson “participat[e] in counseling to address past trauma and current stress related
anxiety.” (47305 PSI, p.26.) Mr. Stevenson asserts that all of this mitigating evidence should
have been afforded more weight by the district court.
Mr. Stevenson has also expressed remorse for his crimes, which a district court should
consider as mitigating. Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding aggregate
sentence for nine related counts of grand theft to be excessive, in part, because of the defendant’s
expressions of remorse); see also State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Coffin
points to several mitigating circumstances that he contends rendered his sentence unreasonably
long [including] his expression of remorse for his conduct.”); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,
209 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant
expressed “remorse for his conduct”). Mr. Stevenson told the court, “I don't deny any of the
events that put me before you today. I take full accountability for what happened and know that
the blame has got to fall on me.” (July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.41, Ls.14-17.) He also said how “it's
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such a shame that it took me this long to figure this out.” (July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.42, Ls.8-9.) He
ended his statement to the court by saying,
So all in all, at the end of the clay, I guess what I'm thinking, trying to say is I
know I made a mistake. I can't take it back. All I can do is ask for leniency from
the Court and accept the punishment you're about to give me and move forward in
life and learn from my mistakes because this is not a life I want to live any
further.
(July 2019 Sent. Tr., p 43, Ls.3-9.)
Mr. Stevenson also enjoys the support of his family, something that has been considered
a mitigating factor in other cases. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982)
(reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had the support of his family and his employer).
Mr. Stevenson’s mother told the court that “[o]ne thing [Mr. Stevenson] has is strong family
support and always has.” (47307 R., p.559.) Likewise, his father expressed his support for
Mr. Stevenson when he wrote a letter to the court before sentencing begging the court to “please
see it in your heart to give him another chance.” (47307 R., p.558.)
Mr. Stevenson asserts that, had the district court given this mitigating evidence its proper
weight, it should have led the district court to retain jurisdiction, as requested by his attorney
(See July 2019 Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.6-15.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stevenson respectfully requests that this Court remand his cases to the district court
with instructions that the court retain jurisdiction.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2020.
/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of May, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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10

